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ESSAY 
 
“LOSING GROUND”—IN SEARCH OF A REMEDY FOR THE 
OVEREMPHASIS ON LOSS AND OTHER CULPABILITY FACTORS 
IN THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES FOR FRAUD AND THEFT 
DAVID DEBOLD† AND MATTHEW BENJAMIN††
INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2010, fraud offenses were the third largest portion of the fed-
eral criminal docket, trailing only immigration and drug offenses.1  
And yet, the strong criticisms of the primary advisory guideline go-
verning the sentencing of those offenses, U.S. Sentencing Guideline 
§ 2B1.1, remain unaddressed.2  Judges, defense lawyers, and com-
mentators have long called for a reassessment of § 2B1.1’s “inordi-
nate emphasis” on the amount of loss caused by an offense.3
 
†
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to the United States Sentencing Commission and serves as chair of the Commission’s 
Practitioners Advisory Group.  The views he expresses here are in his individual capacity. 
  Even 
††
Associate, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP. 
 
1
 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2010 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STA-
TISTICS fig. A (2010); see also Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Home-
land Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 19 (2011) (statement of Judge Pat-
ti B. Saris, Chair, United States Sentencing Commission) [hereinafter Saris 
Testimony], available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/ 
Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/Testimony/20111012_Saris_Testimony.pdf. 
 
2
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 (2011). 
3
 United States v. Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d 506, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); see also, e.g., 
Frank O. Bowman III, Sentencing High-Loss Corporate Insider Frauds After Booker, 20 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 167, 169 (2008) (“In sum, since Booker, virtually every judge faced with a 
top-level corporate defendant in a very large fraud has concluded that sentences called 
for by the Guidelines were too high.”); Alan Ellis et al., At a “Loss” for Justice:  Federal 
Sentencing for Economic Offenses, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2011, at 34, 35 (“In short, the in-
creasingly complex fraud guideline is rapidly becoming a mess.”); James E. Felman, The 
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the other major participant in the sentencing process—the Depart-
ment of Justice (DOJ)—has called for a comprehensive review of the 
economic crimes guideline.4
The staggering increases in sentence ranges driven by the amount 
of loss,
 
5 combined with largely duplicative sentencing enhancements,6 
have escalated advisory guidelines sentences for high-loss frauds 
beyond those once reserved for violent criminals.  Indeed, the memo-
randum opposing the government’s request to imprison Raj Rajarat-
nam for between 235 and 293 months (approximately 19.5 to 24.5 
years) noted that the “average sentence imposed for manslaughter in 
2010 was 73 months; for kidnapping and hostage-taking, 163 months; 
for sexual abuse, 109 months; for robbery, 77 months; for arson, 79 
months, and for child pornography, 118 months.”7  On October 13, 
2011, Rajaratnam received a sentence of 132 months (11 years) in pris-
on, the longest term ever imposed for insider trading,8 though it pales 
in comparison to sentences imposed in other recent fraud cases.9
 
Need to Reform the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for High-Loss Economic Crimes, 23 FED. SENT’G. 
REP. 138, 139 (2010) (describing the current high-loss guidelines as “overkill”).  
 
 
4
See Hearing on Proposed Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines Before the U.S. Sen-
tencing Comm’n, 112th Cong. 2, 4 (2011) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Preet 
Bharara, United States Attorney, Southern District of New York), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/
20110216/Testimony_DOJ_%20Bharara.pdf; Letter from Jonathan J. Wroblewski, Di-
rector, Office of Policy and Legislation, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to the Honorable William 
K. Sessions III, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 4-5 (June 28, 2010) [hereinafter 
Wroblewski Letter] (recommending reform of the economic crimes guideline due to 
significant variances at the district court level), reprinted in 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 282 
(2011); see also infra text accompanying note 45. 
 
5
 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(1). 
 
6
 See id. § 2B1.1(b)(10) (increasing sentence where defendant used “sophisticated 
means”); see also James Felman & Mary Price, Out-of-Control Fraud Guidelines, NAT’L L.J., 
July 25, 2011, at 43, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp? 
id=1202504720046&slreturn=1 (describing redundant sentencing enhancements as 
one of the major weaknesses of the fraud guidelines). 
 
7
 Reply Sentencing Memorandum for Defendant at 2, United States v. Raja-
ratnam, No. 09-1184 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2011), 2011 WL 4021121 [hereinafter Raja-
ratnam Sent’g Memo.]. 
8
See Peter Lattman, 11 Years in Jail for Fund Chief in Stock Deals, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 14, 2011, at A1. 
 
9
 For example, on September 16, 2011—less than one month before Rajaratnam’s 
sentencing—Judge James Lawrence King of the Southern District of Florida imposed 
the longest sentence ever given to a Medicare fraud offender, sentencing Lawrence 
Duran, the president of American Therapeutic Corp., to fifty years imprisonment.  Du-
ran’s co-conspirator Marianella Valera received a sentence of thirty-five years.  Jay 
Weaver, Judge Sends Therapist to Prison for 35 Years in Massive Medicare-Fraud Case, MIAMI 
DEBOLDBENJAMIN FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2011  11:29 AM 
2011] Losing Ground 143 
The severity of loss-driven sentences has provoked significant judi-
cial criticism of the economic crimes guideline, memorably derided 
by Judge Frederick Block in United States v. Parris as “a black stain on 
common sense.”10  Employing their discretion to “vary” from the advi-
sory guidelines range based on policy disagreements, federal judges 
have increasingly imposed non-government-sponsored below-range 
variances in fraud cases since Booker.11
In Part I, we trace briefly the history of various amendments to the 
economic crimes guideline, which quickly ratcheted up both the 
prominence of loss as a sentencing input and the severity of sentences 
generally.  In Part II, we describe the recent mounting pressure on the 
U.S. Sentencing Commission to conduct a comprehensive review of 
the economic crimes guideline, and the scuttling of those efforts.  In 
Part III, we explore the economic crimes guideline’s overemphasis on 
loss and the pernicious consequences of that overemphasis.  In Part 
IV, we propose a series of targeted remedies that would help in the ef-
fort to rebalance the various sentencing inputs for economic crimes. 
  These variances are part of an 
escalating attack on the rationality of the economic crimes guideline. 
I. HOW WE GOT HERE 
The development of the economic crimes guideline has been 
fully chronicled elsewhere,12 and we therefore trace that history only 
briefly, focusing in particular on the inconsistency and irrationality 
underlying the Commission’s insistent upward ratcheting in re-
sponse to political pressure.13
When Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, it 
specifically directed the Commission to promulgate guidelines that 
 
 
HERALD, Sept. 19, 2011, available at http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/09/19/ 
2414969/judge-sends-therapist-to-prison.html. 
  That same day, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the hotly contested 
twenty-seven-year sentence of Sholom Rubashkin, who was convicted for numerous 
frauds causing a calculated $27 million loss.  United States v. Rubashkin, 655 F.3d 849, 
855 (8th Cir. 2011).  Rubashkin’s sentence fell at the low end of the guideline range.  Id. 
 
10
United States v. Parris, 573 F. Supp. 2d 744, 754 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 
11
Saris Testimony, supra note 1, at 7 (citing United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 
220 (2005)). 
 
12
See generally Frank O. Bowman III, Pour Encourager Les Autres?  The Curious History 
and Distressing Implications of the Criminal Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Sen-
tencing Guidelines Amendments That Followed, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 373 (2004). 
 
13
See, e.g., Rajaratnam Sent’g Memo., supra note 7, at 8 (arguing that the 
guidelines for economic crimes tend “to yield these unduly severe sentences be-
cause they have been repeatedly stiffened in response to political pressure instead 
of empirical research”). 
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met the “purposes of sentencing”14 and to use as a “starting point” the 
average sentences actually served during the pre-guidelines period.15  
The original Commission could not agree on which sentencing pur-
poses should predominate, however, and instead purportedly based 
the guidelines exclusively on the latter, empirical approach.  But the 
fraud guideline was an exception even to that compromise.  Accord-
ing to Justice Breyer, the original Commission, of which he was a 
member, abandoned “the touchstone of prior past practice” with re-
spect to economic crimes.16  Instead, the Commission decided to re-
quire short but certain periods of confinement for all but the least ser-
ious offenders, generally exceeding the average penalties imposed in 
the pre-guidelines period for economic crimes.17
Merely two years after the promulgation of the initial 1987 guide-
lines, the Commission enhanced penalties again by revising the loss 
table.
 
18  Though the Commission justified the change by invoking the 
goals of “provid[ing] additional deterrence and better reflect[ing] the 
seriousness of the conduct,”19 a former commissioner and a former 
deputy chief counsel complained that the increases were motivated by 
pressure from the DOJ and grounded in “overtly political and inex-
pert” reasons.20
 
14
See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(A) (2006). 
  Between 1989 and 2001, the Commission promulgat-
ed several aggravating specific offense characteristics, many of which 
duplicated the factors for which loss alone had previously “served as a 
 
15
See 28 U.S.C. § 994(m) (2006). 
 
16
Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon 
Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 23 (1988). 
 
17
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2F1.1 (1987); id. ch. 1, pt. A, 4(d) 
(2011) (providing for “at least a short period of imprisonment in [economic crime] 
cases”); see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENC-
ING:  AN ASSESSMENT OF HOW WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS 
ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM 56 (2004) [hereinafter FIFTEEN-YEAR 
REPORT] (noting the shift from probation to incarceration for economic crimes dur-
ing the guidelines period). 
 
18
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amends. 99, 154 (1989).  The 
amendments to the loss tables for theft and fraud imposed higher offense levels start-
ing at loss amounts of more than $40,000 and added four more loss ranges at the top 
of the table.  Thus, for example, the enhancement for a fraud loss of more than 
$800,000 went from eight levels to eleven, and the largest loss amount (more than 
$80,000,000) would now receive an enhancement of eighteen offense levels instead of 
eleven levels.  The stated reasons for the amendments—“to conform the theft and 
fraud loss tables to the tax evasion table”—demonstrates how efforts to get tough on 
one offense have ripple effects.  See id. amend. 154. 
 
19
Id. 
 
20
Jeffrey S. Parker & Michael K. Block, The Sentencing Commission, P.M. (Post-
Mistretta):  Sunshine or Sunset?, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 289, 320 (1989). 
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rough proxy.”21  And in 2001, the Commission’s multi-year review of 
the sentences for fraud and theft culminated in the merging of three 
guidelines—§ 2F1.1 (fraud), § 2B1.1 (theft/embezzlement), and 
§ 2B3.1 (property destruction)—into one guideline, § 2B1.1, with a 
more severe loss table.22  These increased penalties were based, in 
part, on an ill-guided effort to create rough parity with the drug 
guidelines, which themselves lacked empirical basis and were dictated 
by mandatory minimum sentences over which the Commission had no 
input or control.23
A series of major corporate and accounting scandals—Enron, 
Adelphia, WorldCom, Tyco—followed close on the heels of these 
“economic crimes package” amendments and generated inevitable 
pressure to “do something.”  Choosing to ignore the “something” that 
the Commission had just done—making a substantial change to the 
economic crimes guideline that would soon result in much higher 
sentences in fraud cases—Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002, which raised statutory maximums for most fraud offenses.
 
24
 
 
21
Bowman, supra note 
  
Reacting to directives in the Act and pressure from the DOJ, the 
Commission then raised the base offense level from six to seven for 
defendants convicted of an offense with a statutory maximum of twen-
3, at 170; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
app. C, amend. 317 (1990) (increasing the sentence if the “offense substantially jeo-
pardized . . . a financial institution”); id. amend. 551 (1997) (increasing the sentence if 
the offense involved misappropriation of a trade secret and the defendant knew it 
would benefit a foreign state); id. amend. 576 (1998) (increasing the sentence if the 
“offense involved theft of property from a national cemetery”); id. amend. 596 (2000) 
(increasing the sentence if the offense involved, inter alia, trafficking devices or unau-
thorized transfer of identification).  By way of example, the initial fraud guideline, § 
2F1.1, included two specific offense characteristics in addition to loss, one with four 
subparts applicable in the alternative and one that required a floor of twelve levels.  See 
id. § 2F1.1 (1987).  If there was “more than minimal planning” and “more than one 
victim,” one two-level enhancement applied.  Today, § 2B1.1 has seventeen specific of-
fense characteristics in addition to the loss table, and many have multiple alternatives.  
See id. § 2B1.1(b) (2011).  “Sophisticated means” and “250 or more victims” produce a 
cumulative eight-level enhancement.  Id. at § 2B1.1(b)(2), (b)(10). 
 
22
Id. app. C, amend. 617 (2001).  The new loss table used two-level increments 
rather than one-level, and increased the penalties at numerous loss amounts.  Id.  
Moreover, the amendment revised the definition of “actual loss” to include “reasonably 
foreseeable pecuniary harm,” much like the broader, civil definition.  Id. 
 
23
See generally Hon. Joe Kendall, Remarks at U.S. Sentencing Comm’n Symposium 
Panel on the Nature and Severity of Punishment for Economic Crimes:  Determinants 
of Offense Seriousness and Offender Culpability 54-69 (Oct. 12, 2000).   
 
24
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered 
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).  See generally Bowman, supra note 12, at 373. 
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ty years.25  More importantly, the newly revised guideline also substan-
tially increased the prominence of loss and other aggravating factors.26
II. CALLS FOR COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW 
 
A. The DOJ’s and Congress’s Responses to Judicial Criticism 
In a trio of decisions from 2005 to 2007, the Supreme Court ren-
dered the guidelines advisory,27 established a deferential standard for 
appellate review,28 and authorized judges to reject the Commission’s 
policy judgments in certain circumstances.29  Exercising this newfound 
discretion to vary from the guidelines, several judges have taken aim 
at the economic crimes guideline.30
virtually every judge faced with a top-level corporate fraud defendant in 
a very large fraud has concluded that sentences called for by the Guide-
lines were too high.  This near unanimity suggests that the judiciary sees a 
consistent disjunction between the sentences prescribed by the Guidelines 
[in corporate fraud cases] and the fundamental requirement of Section 
3553(a) that judges impose sentences “sufficient, but not greater than ne-
cessary” to comply with its objectives.
  By 2008, one prominent com-
mentator observed that, since Booker: 
31
 
 
25
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 653 (2003).   
 
 
26
Specifically, the loss table was extended by two additional brackets, and en-
hancements for “officer/director,” “company insolvency,” and “more than 250 victims” 
were added.  Id. amends. 647 & 653. 
 
27
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). 
 
28
See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 52 (2007) (“The uniqueness of the indi-
vidual case, however, does not change the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard of 
review that applies to all sentencing decisions.”). 
 
29
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 101 (2007).  The Court has reaffirmed 
this line of authority in subsequent decisions.  See Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 
1229, 1236 (2011) (rejecting an argument that the sentencing court must use the 
“same percentage departure[s]” as the guidelines recommend); Spears v. United 
States, 555 U.S. 261, 265-66 (2009) (permitting virtually any variance if based on the 
individualized features of the case). 
 
30
See, e.g., United States v. Parris, 573 F. Supp. 2d 744, 745 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (im-
posing a term of five years where the guidelines range suggested thirty years to life, and 
explicitly criticizing the economic crimes guideline); United States v. Adelson, 441 F. 
Supp. 2d 506, 506 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding a guidelines sentence in a securities fraud 
case so outrageous that the judge had to rely on other factors); United States v. Muef-
felman, 400 F. Supp. 2d 368, 377-78 (D. Mass. 2005) (arguing that total loss should be 
a contingent factor, not absolute); see also United States v. Emmenegger, 329 F. Supp. 
2d 416, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (weighing factors outside of the guidelines calculations 
during sentencing in a securities fraud case). 
 
31
Bowman, supra note 3, at 169 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553).   
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In its June 2010 annual report to the Commission, the Depart-
ment of Justice responded to this phenomenon.  Observing the exis-
tence of “certain offense types for which the guidelines have lost the 
respect of a large number of judges,” the Department’s ex-officio rep-
resentative on the Commission, Jonathan Wroblewski, called for a 
comprehensive review of, and possible amendments to, those guide-
lines.32  Wroblewski then specifically cited two guidelines “that have 
lost the backing of a large part of the judiciary”:  the guidelines for 
child pornography possession offenses and fraud offenses.33
With respect to the economic crimes guideline, Wroblewski de-
cried the increasing frequency of district courts sentencing “fraud of-
fenders—especially high-loss fraud offenders—inconsistently and 
without regard to the federal sentencing guidelines.”
 
34  The letter did 
not move far beyond “handwringing,” however35:  after declaring “cur-
rent sentencing outcomes” to be “unacceptable,” Wroblewski called 
on the Commission to “determine whether some reforms are needed.  
Such reforms might include amendments to the sentencing guideline 
for fraud offenses, recommendations for new statutory penalties, or 
other policy changes.”36
Responses to the Wroblewski letter varied.  Testifying before the 
Commission on behalf of the American Bar Association, James Fel-
man speculated that the “reference to ‘new statutory penalties’ is pre-
sumably intended to suggest mandatory minimum penalties for cer-
tain economic offenses.”
 
37  Professor Frank Bowman noted a 
“dramatic change in tone,” suggesting that the “DOJ recognizes the 
problem they’ve got in the fraud area is the guidelines have become 
disconnected from reality, at least at the top end, for high-loss, corpo-
rate official-type sentences.”38
 
 
32
Wroblewski Letter, supra note 
  And in a stinging rejoinder, Judge John 
Gleeson of the Eastern District of New York suggested that the De-
4, at 2-3; see also Marcia Coyle, DOJ Wants Sentences 
Examined; Prosecutors See Disparity in Fraud, Child Pornography Punishments, NAT’L L.J., 
July 19, 2010, at 21, 25 (quoting former federal judge Paul Cassell as stating, “I think 
they’re conceding judges have lost confidence in those guidelines for good reason—
they’re mindlessly draconian in some situations.”). 
 
33
Wroblewski Letter, supra note 4, at 3. 
 
34
Id. at 4. 
 
35
United States v. Ovid, No. 09-0216, 2010 WL 3940724, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2010). 
 
36
Wroblewski Letter, supra note 4, at 5. 
 
37
Hearings, supra note 4, at 12 (statement of James E. Felman on behalf of the Amer-
ican Bar Association), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_ 
Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/20110216/Testimony_ABA_%20Felman.pdf. 
 
38
Coyle, supra note 32, at 25 (quoting Professor Bowman).  
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partment had failed to avail itself of a clear solution to the “‘unac-
ceptable’ outcomes [it] complain[ed] about”:  appellate review.39  
Noting that prosecutors had appealed only 18 of the 1711 non-
government-sponsored below-range variances imposed in fiscal year 
2009, Judge Gleeson questioned why the Department had “chosen to 
complain about fraud sentences to the Commission but not to the 
circuit courts of appeals.”40
At a time when even the Department recognized that some 
change in direction was needed, it continued to be business as usual 
at Congress.  The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Pro-
tection Act
 
41 and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,42 
both passed in 2010, directed the Commission to revisit the penalties 
for health care fraud, securities fraud, and bank fraud.  Dodd-Frank’s 
instruction was general:  the Commission must ensure that the penal-
ties for securities fraud and bank fraud fully reflect “the serious nature 
of [those] offenses,” the “need for an effective deterrent and appro-
priate punishment to prevent [those] offenses,” and “the effectiveness 
of incarceration in furthering” those objectives.43  The health care 
reform law, on the other hand, mandated a more aggressive, burden-
shifting definition of “intended loss” and specific new offense-level in-
creases—applicable only to fraud involving government health care 
programs—for higher loss amounts.44
B. Ready, Set . . . No 
  In neither Act did Congress 
explain why existing penalties for health care fraud, securities fraud, 
and bank fraud are insufficient, nor was it evident why health care 
fraud, which only rarely victimizes individuals, should be treated more 
severely than every other fraud. 
Given the appeals from a diverse group of stakeholders, including 
the DOJ, for something more than a piecemeal reaction to congress-
 
 
39
Ovid, 2010 WL 3940724, at *2. 
 
40
Id. at *9. 
 
41
See Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1079A, 124 Stat. 1376, 2077 (2010) (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 994).  
 
42
See Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10606, 124 Stat. 119, 1006 (2010) (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 994). 
43
§ 1079A (a)(1)(B)(i), 124 Stat. at 2078. 
 
44
§ 10606(a)(2)(B), 124 Stat. at 1007.  This amendment threatens to shift the 
burden to the defendant of disproving intended loss, even in cases involving “upcod-
ing,” false certification, or other instances where billing was submitted for services ac-
tually rendered.  See Hearings, supra note 4, at 9 (statement of James E. Felman). 
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ional directives that nibble around the edges, many entered this ca-
lendar year cautiously optimistic that the Commission would launch a 
comprehensive, multi-year review of the economic crimes guideline. 
Early signs were promising.  In its January 2011 Notice of Pro-
posed Amendments, the Commission responded to the directives con-
tained in Dodd-Frank by announcing the possibility of a comprehen-
sive, multi-year review: 
[T]he Commission is considering conducting a more comprehen-
sive review of § 2B1.1 and related guidelines, not only of the specific of-
fense characteristics referred to in the directives (§ 2B1.1(b)(14) and 
(17)), but also of certain other aspects of the guidelines (e.g., the loss ta-
ble and the definition of loss; the victims table and the definition of victim; 
and the interactions between these tables and definitions).45
The following month, at a public hearing on proposed amend-
ments for 2011, a broad cross-section of witnesses, including United 
States Attorney Preet Bharara for the Southern District of New York, 
supported such a review.
 
46  And in March 2011, the Commission re-
ceived comment letters favoring it.47
 
 
45
Notice of Proposed Amendments to Sentencing Guidelines, Policy Statements, 
and Commentary, 76 Fed. Reg. 3193, 3201 (Jan. 19, 2011). 
 
 
46
See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 4, at 4 (statement of Preet Bharara) (“As we have 
stated before, the Department fully supports the Commission’s plan for a thorough 
review of the federal sentencing guidelines that relate to fraud offenses generally as 
well as to securities, bank, and mortgage fraud offenses in particular.”); id. at 2 (state-
ment of Hector Dopico, Supervisory Assistant, Federal Public Defender for the South-
ern District of Florida, Federal Public and Community Defenders), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/
20110216/Testimony_FPD_Dopico.pdf (“Given the complexity of the fraud guidelines, 
and the wide variety of circumstances involving frauds on Government health care 
programs, we believe that the Commission should undertake a comprehensive review 
of the fraud guideline in general and health care fraud offenses specifically.”); id. at 1 
(statement of Susan Howley, Director, Public Policy and Victims Services, National 
Center for Victims of Crime), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_ 
Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/20110216/Testimony_VAG_Howley_ 
Panel_II.pdf (“We urge the Commission to undertake a broad review of §2B1.1, not 
only with an eye to the Dodd-Frank Act, but to reconsider sentencing for serious 
property offenses.”); id. at 3 (statement of Eric A. Tirschwell, Practitioners Advisory 
Group), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Public_ 
Hearings_and_Meetings/20110216/Testimony_PAG_Tirschwell.pdf (“We encourage 
the Commission to undertake the comprehensive review of § 2B1.1 that the Pro-
posed Amendments say the Commission is considering.”).  
 
47
See, e.g., Letter from Jim E. Lavine, President, Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. 
Lawyers (NACDL), to the Honorable Patti B. Saris, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 
11 (Mar. 21, 2011) (“NACDL supports a comprehensive review of § 2B1.1, and urges 
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By mid-summer, however, the Commission had backed off.  In July 
2011, the Commission identified among its proposed priorities for 
2012 the continuation of its work implementing the directives of 
Dodd-Frank and “any other crime legislation enacted during the 
111th or 112th Congress warranting a Commission response.”48  This 
fell well short of the comprehensive, multi-year review of § 2B1.1 pre-
viewed just five months earlier.  And despite a number of comment 
letters urging the Commission to reconsider its rejection of a com-
prehensive review,49 in September 2011, the Commission adopted the 
narrower priority as proposed.50
For the time being, then, it appears that the economic crimes 
guideline’s “inordinate emphasis” on loss is not going anywhere.  As 
explained in the next Part, that decision is highly unfortunate. 
 
III.  LOSS, DISPARITY, AND THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 
The heavy emphasis on loss in the economic crimes guideline, 
combined with the possibility of multiple additional enhancements 
for overlapping offense characteristics, leads to particularly pernicious 
forms of unwarranted disparity. 
Several federal judges and commentators have observed that loss 
is only a very rough barometer of an individual defendant’s culpabili-
ty.51
 
the Commission not to respond to the directives before the current amendment 
cycle ends on May 1, 2011.”). 
  An earlier background note to § 2B1.1 accurately identified loss 
 
48
See Notice of Proposed Priorities, 76 Fed. Reg. 45007, 45008 (July 27, 2011). 
 
49
Several organizations submitted comment letters in August 2011 urging the 
Commission to “maintain as a priority for the upcoming amendment cycle the ‘more 
comprehensive review of Section 2B1.1 and related guidelines’ that [it] signaled earli-
er this year it was ready to undertake.”   Letter from David Debold, Chair, and Eric A. 
Tirschwell, Vice Chair, Practitioners Advisory Grp., to the Honorable Patti B. Saris, 
Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2 (Aug. 31, 2011); see also Letter from Thomas M. 
Susman, Director, Gov’t Affairs Office, Am. Bar Ass’n, to the Honorable Patti B. Saris 1 
(Aug. 25, 2011); Letter from Miriam Conrad, Vice Chair, and Marjorie Meyers, Chair, 
Fed. Defender Sentencing Guidelines Comm., to the Honorable Patti B. Saris 2-3 
(Aug. 26, 2011).  Indeed, even the Department reiterated its earlier call, noting that it 
had previously “urged the Commission to review the guidelines for economic crimes 
with a special focus on high-loss fraud cases.”  Letter from Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant 
Att’y Gen., and Jonathan J. Wroblewski, Director, Office of Policy & Legislation, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, to the Honorable Patti B. Saris 6 (Sept. 2, 2011).    
 
50
Notice of Final Priorities, 76 Fed. Reg. 58564 (Sept. 21, 2011). 
 
51
See, e.g., United States v. Watt, 707 F. Supp. 2d 149, 155 (D. Mass. 2010) (“Loss 
under the Guidelines is effectively a proxy for evaluating culpability.  Sometimes it is 
appropriate, and sometimes it is not.”); United States v. Emmenegger, 329 F. Supp. 2d 
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as something of a proxy for culpability because it reflected both “harm 
to the victim” and “gain to the defendant.”52
No one could seriously doubt that, “[a]ll else being equal, large 
thefts damage society more than small ones, create a greater tempta-
tion for potential offenders, and thus generally require greater de-
terrence and more serious punishment.”
  The problem is that loss 
has taken on a role in the sentence calculation that dwarfs most of the 
other important factors. 
53
The economic crimes guideline calls for use of either “actual” loss 
or “intended” loss, whichever is higher.  Actual loss might be higher 
because of foreseeable pecuniary harms to the victims that the defen-
dant did not intend to bring about.  Intended loss might be higher 
where the scheme is thwarted before it has a chance to succeed.  But 
even these simple distinctions raise serious questions about propor-
tionality.  If two defendants embark on identical schemes with identical 
intended loss, why punish more severely the one who inflicted a higher 
actual loss just because he happened to succeed?  And if two defendants 
engage in mortgage fraud, but only one has the fortuity of selling his 
house and paying off his loan before market conditions unexpectedly 
deteriorate, why punish more severely the one who started the crime a 
few months later and therefore got stuck by the market downturn?  
These are just two examples in which the amount of loss is driven by 
factors unrelated to the defendant’s level of culpability.
  But rarely is all else even 
close to equal, and that is where the current emphasis on loss leads to 
unwarranted disparity. 
54
It is worth pausing to note that the problem of disparity comes in 
more than one form.  We have just seen examples of “like” offenders 
 
 
416, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (describing the amount of loss as a “relatively weak indicator 
of the moral seriousness of the offense or the need for deterrence”). 
 
52
Watt, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 155 n.10 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MA-
NUAL app. C, amend. 617 (2001)). 
 
53
Emmenegger, 329 F. Supp. 2d at 427. 
 
54
Another example is where co-conspirators trade on the same inside information 
to purchase stock but hold onto that stock for different periods of time before selling.  
See United States v. Mooney, 425 F.3d 1093, 1107 (8th Cir. 2005) (Bright, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that, in this case, the majority’s decision to determine gain from the crime at 
the time of sale rather than from the amount derived from the insider trading leads to 
“unequal justice for equal crimes”).  Consider also Congress’s directive that health care 
fraud should be sentenced under its own, more punitive definition of “intended loss,” 
and that the resulting loss amounts should in turn result in greater punishment for 
health care fraud than for all other types of fraud.  See Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 
10606(a)(2)(B), 124 Stat. 119, 1006 (2010) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 994).  As 
George Orwell might have put it, when it comes to culpability, all frauds are equal, but 
some are more equal than others.  Cf. GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM ch. 10 (1945). 
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being treated differently for reasons unrelated to the purposes of pun-
ishment.  The converse is no less worrisome:  Defendants are often 
treated the same under the economic crimes guideline even though the 
purposes of punishment call for different treatment.  Another name for 
this is unwarranted uniformity.  It happens under the economic crimes 
guideline in a number of ways.  For example, “we now have an advisory 
guidelines regime where . . . any officer or director of virtually any pub-
lic corporation who has committed securities fraud will be confronted 
with a guidelines calculation either calling for or approaching lifetime 
imprisonment.”55  In short, the economic crimes guideline does not 
adequately distinguish Bernie Madoff from Richard Adelson.56
But even in cases where the prescribed punishment falls short of a 
life sentence, the loss table fails to differentiate offenders who ought 
to be differentiated.  For example, an amount of loss—especially when 
it is actual loss—does not tell us anything about why the defendant 
committed the offense or how much he personally benefited.  These 
motive-based facts are important for issues of retribution, deterrence, 
and the need for incapacitation.  Take an accountant at a public 
company who is deliberately ignorant of a subordinate’s improper 
bookkeeping.  Assume that this defendant turns a blind eye because 
he is afraid the company might miss its earnings target, and he is un-
der great pressure not to let that happen in light of the negative reac-
tion the year before when his honest reporting of a bookkeeping mis-
take caused the company to fall short.  With a public company that 
issues millions of shares, even small inflation in the price of a stock 
can add up to tens of millions of dollars in loss.  Even if this defendant 
never sold any stock, and therefore never realized a penny of gain 
from the fraud, the guidelines would treat him the same as a career 
con man who creates a phony company, runs it as a Ponzi scheme, 
pockets tens of millions in proceeds for his own benefit, and flees the 
 
 
 
55
United States v. Parris, 573 F. Supp. 2d 744, 754 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 
56
Derick R. Vollrath, Note, Losing the Loss Calculation:  Toward a More Just Sentenc-
ing Regime in White-Collar Criminal Cases, 59 DUKE L.J. 1001, 1002 (2010).  Adelson, the 
president of Impath, uncovered a sophisticated accounting fraud designed by other 
Impath employees to inflate the value of the company’s stock.  United States v. Adel-
son, 441 F. Supp. 2d 506, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (Rakoff, J.).  Relatively late in the con-
spiracy, Adelson chose to conceal the fraud rather than report it.  Id.; see also Does Mon-
ey Play Too Large a Role in Federal Sentencing?, CRIME IN THE SUITES (Nov. 15, 2010), 
http://crimeinthesuites.com/does-money-play-too-large-a-role-in-federal-sentencing 
(quoting Judge Rakoff’s description of Richard Adelson as a “very decent human being 
who towards the end of a fraud perpetrated mostly by other people[] became involved 
and made a mistake and covered it up”).   
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country.  Motive, intent, and personal gain are all important offense 
characteristics that do not get accounted for in the guidelines. 
Finally, the overemphasis on loss, both in proportion to other fac-
tors and as a driver of sentence severity, encourages a third disparity 
less frequently characterized as such:  the vastly dissimilar sentences 
received by those who cooperate and those who exercise their Sixth 
Amendment right to trial.  Armed with the leverage of a draconian 
guideline range driven by an aggressive loss calculation, the govern-
ment can more readily extract guilty pleas in exchange for negotiated 
charges and facts.  For example, in exchange for a guilty plea, the 
government may allow the defendant to plead to a charge with a rela-
tively low statutory maximum.57  One commentator has suggested that 
“[t]his means of case resolution is the likely norm going forward” in 
high-loss fraud cases.58  Alternatively, and more pertinently, the gov-
ernment may bargain away millions of dollars in loss by stipulating to 
specific calculations—again, in exchange for guilty pleas.  The coer-
cive power of this tactic was not lost on Raj Rajaratnam, whose lawyers 
pointed to the discrepancy between the amount of gain that the gov-
ernment initially alleged his cooperating co-conspirator had received, 
and the significantly lower amount that the government stipulated to 
in her plea agreement.  Because he went to trial, Rajaratnam alleged, 
the government had increased the amount of gain charged in the in-
dictment by $20 million.59
 
 
57
See, e.g., United States v. Ovid, No. 09-216, 2010 WL 3940724, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 1, 2010) (“In exchange for Ovid’s plea of guilty to Count One, which carried a 
five-year statutory maximum, the government agreed to dismiss other pending charges, 
which exposed Ovid to an additional 40 years in prison.”); United States v. Watt, 707 F. 
Supp. 2d 149, 151, 155 (D. Mass. 2010) (explaining that the government agreed to a 
plea to a single count with a 60-month statutory maximum where advisory guidelines 
sentence was life imprisonment, and imposing a 24-month term).  
 
 
58
Hearings, supra note 4, at 7 n.22 (statement of James E. Felman); see also id. 
(“Where the guidelines routinely call for a lifetime of imprisonment, a significant portion 
of the sentencing function is transferred to the prosecutors who select the statutory max-
imum penalties of the counts to which the defendant will be permitted to plead guilty.”). 
 
59
The Rajartnam team argued:  
The “accidental” relationship of the gain amount to the defendant’s actual 
culpability surely explains why the government is willing to bargain away mil-
lions of dollars of gain in order to obtain guilty pleas by stipulating to gain 
calculations acceptable to both sides.  For example, Mr. Rajaratnam and Dan-
ielle Chiesi were originally indicted together on charges of securities fraud 
and conspiracy.  The Superseding Indictment charged that Mr. Rajaratnam’s 
conduct resulted in $45 million of gain to Galleon and that Ms. Chiesi’s con-
duct resulted in $4 million of gain to New Castle.  But Ms. Chiesi’s plea 
agreement stipulates that the amount of unlawful gain is less than $2.5 mil-
lion—resulting in a Guidelines calculation 2 points lower than it would have 
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Professor Bowman has correctly argued that the government’s wil-
lingness to afford steep sentencing discounts to cooperating defen-
dants reflects not only a “reward for effective cooperation, but a sub 
rosa acknowledgment by both prosecutors and the courts that the 
starting point for departures in these cases should be far lower than 
the Guidelines nominally require.”60  Judge Gleeson echoed this sup-
position in Ovid.61  Whatever the government’s motivation, white-
collar offenders who proceed to trial must be prepared to defend not 
only against charges with significantly higher statutory maximums but 
also against more aggressive and creative loss calculations.  The gov-
ernment effectively acknowledged as much during the recent sentenc-
ing of lobbyist Kevin Ring.62
IV. TARGETED SUGGESTIONS 
 
Fortunately, a few relatively simple revisions could be made that 
would reduce the economic crimes guideline’s overemphasis on loss 
and consequent potential for unwarranted disparities. 
First, amount of loss should simply be a less significant sentencing 
input.  One way to effect this change is to broaden the brackets of loss 
amounts in the loss table and employ a progressively decreasing scale 
in which each doubling of the loss amount has a smaller effect on the 
offense level.63
 
been had she been held responsible for the $4 million charged in the indict-
ment. In contrast, the government argues that Mr. Rajaratnam is responsible 
for $63 million of gain, nearly $20 million more than charged in the indict-
ment, resulting in a Guidelines calculation 2 points higher than it would have 
been if the amount charged in the indictment had been used. 
  There is no empirical basis for subdividing monetary 
loss into sixteen different levels.  One legal policy organization recent-
ly suggested that the Commission “should justify any cutoff between 
the various levels of enhancement and should seek to tailor each level 
Rajaratnam Sent’g Memo., supra note 7, at 6 n.3 (citations omitted). 
 
60
Bowman, supra note 3, at 170. 
 
61
Ovid, 2010 WL 3940724, at *10 (“Perhaps, as in this case, the prosecutors who 
are actually handling the cases in the courtrooms do not regard the sentences as unac-
ceptable simply because they are below the advisory Guidelines ranges.”). 
 
62
See United States v. Ring, No. 08-274, 2011 WL 4360005, at *4 n.9 (D.D.C. 
Sept. 20, 2011) (quoting the government at oral argument as saying, “Mr. Ring 
chose to proceed to trial, expend government resources, the court’s resources, and 
the public’s resources and therefore is not similarly situated to others who pled 
guilty early on in the investigation”). 
 
63
Ellis et al., supra note 3, at 39-40. 
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to an empirical rationale for the line drawn.”64
Second, the Commission should cabin the scope of “intended 
loss.”  In United States v. Manatau, the Tenth Circuit recently held that 
the amount of “intended loss” includes only those losses that are an ob-
ject of the defendant’s specific purpose, not those that are merely “poss-
ible and potentially contemplated.”
  It may be that an 
empirical rationale cannot be found, but that in itself would be a 
highly useful piece of information when deciding how much weight 
to give loss and how to make distinctions between different amounts.  
If fewer distinctions are needed, then the Commission could also re-
turn to the pre-2001 approach of one-level increases from one loss-
amount bracket to the next. 
65  To the extent that the current 
guideline can be read to permit a broader concept of “intended loss,”66
Third, the amount of the defendant’s pecuniary gain should be a 
more consequential sentencing input.  Currently, a defendant’s gain 
may be considered only if there was a loss that reasonably cannot be 
determined; in other words, the defendant’s gain is used only as a 
substitute measure for loss.
 
the Commission should expressly endorse the Manatau definition. 
67  But as the DOJ has acknowledged, cases in 
which loss greatly exceeds a defendant’s gain are likely candidates for 
below-guidelines variances.68  The Commission should revise the eco-
nomic crimes guidelines to incorporate consideration of a defendant’s 
pecuniary gain.  As one possible approach, the American Bar Associa-
tion has proposed simplified tables for loss and gain, “with the adjust-
ments from both tables applied cumulatively in appropriate cases.”69
Fourth, and in a similar vein, the Commission should explore of-
fense-level decreases or an offense-level cap in cases where loss greatly 
exceeds a defendant’s gain.  The drug guideline has a similar “mitigat-
ing role” cap for those who were minor or minimal participants in an 
offense.
 
70
 
 
64
Comments from Daniel J. Popeo & Michael P. Wilt, Wash. Legal Found., to the 
U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 3 (Aug. 26, 2011), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ 
Meetings_and_Rulemaking/Public_Comment/20110826/Washington-Legal-
Foundation_PubComm_priorities.pdf. 
  Upon receiving a mitigating role adjustment, a drug defen-
dant’s offense level is limited to an absolute ceiling, or decreased by 
specified levels.  Something similar could work under § 2B1.1.  But ra-
 
65
647 F.3d 1048, 1048-49 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 
66
See, e.g., United States v. Alli, 444 F.3d 34, 38-39 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 
67
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1, Application Note 3(B) (2011). 
 
68
See Hearings, supra note 4, at 45 (response of Preet Bharara). 
 
69
Letter from Thomas M. Susman, supra note 49, app. at 8. 
 
70
See Letter from David Debold, supra note 49, at 3 (discussing § 2D1.1(a)(5)). 
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ther than focus on whether the defendant was a minor or minimal 
participant—which depends on whether others were more involved or 
culpable—the cap or reduction under the economic crimes guideline 
could be triggered where the amount of gain is very low in relation to 
the loss amount that applies to the defendant.  The Commission should 
also consider revising the mitigating role guideline so that reductions 
are available to those whose culpability is less than typical under the ap-
plicable offense guideline (e.g., § 2B1.1), rather than by comparing the 
defendant to co-defendants involved in the same offense conduct. 
Fifth, the Commission must rationalize the proliferation of over-
lapping specific offender characteristics in § 2B1.1.  In addition to loss 
amount, there are seventeen provisions—some with multiple parts—
that enhance sentences based on how the offense was committed.  Not 
only does one aspect of offense conduct often trigger two or more 
enhancement provisions, but the guidelines also operate in such a way 
that each additional factor has a larger effect on the sentence range 
than those before it.71  The Commission itself has acknowledged this 
phenomenon of “factor creep”:  as “more and more adjustments are 
added to the sentencing rules, it is increasingly difficult to ensure that 
the interactions among them, and their cumulative effect, properly 
track offense seriousness.”72
Sixth, the economic crimes guideline explicitly permits a down-
ward departure where a guidelines sentence “substantially overstates 
the seriousness of the offense.”
 
73  As one commentator has suggested, 
the Commission should consider offering nonexclusive examples of 
situations where this language applies.74  Though policy-based va-
riances would of course remain available, clarification would “offer 
meaningful direction to district courts seeking to mitigate the severity 
of the sentencing ranges produced under this guideline” and promote 
the goals of consistency and transparency.75
The sooner the Commission begins to address the problem of 
overemphasis on loss amount in § 2B1.1, the sooner it will be possible 
 
 
 
71
Having two enhancements of two levels each will mean that the top of the new 
range is approximately twice the bottom of the beginning range, even if the starting 
offense level is relatively high.  For example, the bottom of the range for offense level 
26 is 63 months, and the top is 78 months.  At level 30, the range is 97 to 121 months.  
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 5, pt. A, sentencing tbl. (2011).   
 
72
FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 17, at 137.  
 
73
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1, cmt. n.19(C) (2011). 
 
74
See Stephen Kress, Revise U.S.S.G. Section 2B1.1, Application Note 19(c), 23 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 271, 271 (2011). 
75
Id. 
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to draft appropriate language that mitigates the three types of unwar-
ranted disparity experienced under that guideline.  In the meantime, 
sentencing courts will continue to have at their disposal the power to 
vary from the guidelines when they determine that culpability is over-
stated and that various mitigating factors apply. 
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